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Abstract
Demonstrates that the Warsaw Convention, properly interpreted, creates a liability limitation
which is legal and not contractual. The Convention’s limits apply, by its terms, to any cause of
action arising out of injury in international air transportation regardless of whether it is founded in




IN WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS
INTRODUCTION
The Warsaw Convention' is a multilateral treaty drafted at
Warsaw, Poland in 1929 for the purpose "of regulating in a uniform
manner the conditions of international transportation by air." 2 The
Convention accomplished this by establishing uniform rules gov-
erning documentation and the resolution of claims arising out of in-
ternational air transportation. 3 The provisions of the Convention
which impose a presumption of liability against the carrier 4 while,
at the same time, limiting the amount of that liability5 were consid-
ered to be the most important. 6
There has been a considerable amount of litigation concerning
the conditions and circumstances under which the Warsaw Con-
1. Convention for-the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention]. Although not a participant at the Warsaw
conference which drafted the Convention, the United States, by the advice and
consent of the Senate, on June 15, 1934 adhered to the Treaty. The President de-
clared adherence on June 27, 1934 and the declaration was deposited, by the United
States, at Warsaw on July 31, 1934 and was proclaimed effective on October 29,
1934. See Warsaw Convention, Relative to International Transportation by Air, 1934
U.S. Av. REP. 245.
2. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, Preamble.
3. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention,
80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 498-99 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn].
4. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17.
5. The Convention provides that the carrier's liability for injuries to passengers
"shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs," Warsaw Convention, supra note 1
art. 22(1). The limitation of 125,000 francs or approximately $8300 no longer applies
to flights to, from or with an agreed stopping place in the United States. On these
flights the limits have been raised to $75,000 by the Agreement Relating to Liability
Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, CAB Agreement No.
18900, approved by CAB Order No. E-23680, May 13, 1966, CAB Docket 17325, 31
Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Montreal Agreement].
6. Second International Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, October 4-12,
1929, Warsaw Minutes 20 (remarks of Mr. DeVos), 205 (remarks of Mr. Giannini) (R.
Homer & D. Legrez trans. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Minutes]; Lowenfeld
& Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 499.
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vention's liability limitations will apply. 7 The recent decision in In
re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia,8 however, has raised the further
question to whom these limitations apply. The Bali court, applying
California law to wrongful death actions arising out of the April 22,
1974 aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, determined that the Warsaw Con-
vention merely provides air carriers with a contractual limitation of
liability, 9 and that such a limitation can be enforced only against
those in privity of contract.' 0 The court concluded that since the
wrongful death plaintiffs were not parties to the contract of car-
riage, the Convention could not be applied to diminish their re-
covery."
The result in the Bali case cannot be treated as merely a quirk
of local law. If the proposition that the Warsaw Convention merely
provides for a contractual limitation of liability is accepted, similar
results can be expected in other jurisdictions. The California
wrongful death statute, 12 to the extent that it creates an indepen-
dent cause of action with a measure of damages distinct from that
of any cause of action the deceased may have had, 13 is in conform-
ity with the wrongful death statutes 14 of most jurisdictions. 15 There
is a distinction, however, in that most states having such statutes
require, as a condition precedent to maintaining an action, that the
deceased, at the time of his death, had the right to sue, 16 while
there is no such requirement in the California statute.' 7 In the
7. See, e.g., Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (mental anguish and hijacking); Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 229
F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Ga. 1964) (charter flights), aff'd, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); Ross v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 299 N.Y. 88, 85
N.E.2d 880 (1949) (delivery of ticket).
8. 462 F. Supp. 1114 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
9. Id. at 1117, 1126.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377 (West Cur. Supp. 1979).
13. In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114, 1117 (C.D. Cal.
1978); Marks v. Reissinger, 35 Cal. App. 44, 51-53, 169 P. 243, 246-47 (1917); Earley
v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 176 Cal. 79, 81, 167 P. 513, 514 (1917).
14. Similar statutes are in effect in a majority of states. 1 SPEISER, RECOVERY
FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 2:1 (2d ed. 1975). These statutes are patterned after Lord
Campbell's Act, 9 and 10 Vict. C.93 (1846). Id. They are sometimes referred to as
"true" wrongful death statutes. Id. §§ 5:1, 5:14. This Note will deal exclusively with
this type of statute and actions arising thereunder.
15. See generally id. § 3:1.
16. Id. § 5:14.
17. Robinson v. Leigh, 153 Cal. App. 2d 730, 315 P.2d 42 (1957); Marks v.
Reissinger, 35 Cal. App. 44, 169 P. 243 (1917); Earley v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 176 Cal.
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context of a pre-injury contractual limitation of liability this may be
a distinction without a difference. Since the amount and measure
of damages in a "true" wrongful death action are different than in
the cause of action of the deceased, 18 it would seem to be of no
consequence that the amount recoverable in the wrongful death ac-
tion is greater than that which the injured person could have re-
covered in his own behalf. It is the existence of the right of action
in the deceased and not its measure which satisfies the technical
requirement. 19
If the decision in Bali is followed, the probability that a signifi-
cant number of jurisdictions would not apply a contractual limita-
tion of liability against the surviving next of kin presents a very real
danger that the Warsaw Convention may be circumvented in
wrongful death actions. This would frustrate one of the main objec-
tives of the Convention20 by excluding from its purview a large
number of cases to which it explicitly applies. 21
This Note will demonstrate that the Warsaw Convention, prop-
erly interpreted, creates a liability limitation which is legal and not
contractual. The Convention's limits apply, by its terms, to any
cause of action arising out of an injury in international air transpor-
tation regardless of whether it is founded in contract or in tort or
in any other manner.
I. INTERPRETING THE WARSAW CONVENTION
As recognized by the court in Bali the Warsaw Convention is
a federal treaty.2 2 As such it has the force and effect and is of equal
stature with any other federal law. 23 Although the Bali court, in in-
79, 167 P. 513 (1917). Even in this respect, California is not alone. See, e.g., Brown v.
Moore, 247 F.2d 711 (3d Cir.) (applying Pa. law), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 882 (1957);
Goodyear v. Davis, 114 Kan. 557, 220 P. 282 (1923) (construing Federal Employer's
Liability Act); Phillips v. Community Traction Co., 46 Ohio App. 483, 189 N.E. 444
(1933); Rowe v. Richards, 35 S.D. 201, 151 N.W. 1001 (1915).
18. Supra note 15.
19. See, e.g., Mangus v. Miller, 35 Colo. App. 335, 535 P.2d 219 (1975); Lincoln
v. Detroit & M. Ry., 179 Mich. 189, 146 N.W. 405 (1914).
20. The fundamental objective of the Convention was to establish uniform
rules governing international transportation by air. See note 29 infra and accompa-
nying text.
21. Article 17 provides in pertinent part: "The carrier shall be liable for dam-
age sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger .... Warsaw
Convention, supra note 1 art. 17 (emphasis added).
22. 462 F. Supp. at 1124.
23. Smith v. Canadian Pac. Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798, 801 (2d Cir. 1971);
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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terpreting the Convention, felt constrained to "consider what result
is demanded by federal public policy,"2 4 it apparently failed to ap-
preciate that the Convention is itself an expression of that policy.2 5
The accomplishment of the purposes and goals of a treaty or other
compact is the national policy in the areas affected. 26 Thus, the
federal public policy relating to international air law is found by an
examination of the purposes and goals of the Warsaw Convention.
This approach is analogous to the widely accepted doctrine that a
treaty should be interpreted so as to give effect to its purposes to
the greatest extent possible.2 7 It is necessary, therefore, to investi-
gate the purposes of the Convention in order to properly and faith-
fully construe it and apply its provisions to the question to be
resolved. 28
The drafters' conception of the Convention's purposes, as re-
flected in the preamble, was to "regulate in a uniform manner the
conditions of international transportation by air in respect of the
documents used for such transportation and of the liability of
the carrier." 29 The drafters were interested in uniformity in the re-
sults of the Convention's application. 30 The desired uniformity can-
not be attained if the Convention's provisions are construed solely
24. 462 F. Supp. at 1124.
25. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
26. Id. at 224-25.
27. Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 163 (1940); Benjamins v. British
European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 918 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114
(1979); Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1088 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922
(1977); Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804, 812 (2d Cir. 1966).
28. See generally 5 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST § 763 (1906).
29. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, Preamble. The primacy of the objective
of providing a uniform system governing international air transportation has been
recognized in the case law. See Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1083 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d
323, 337-38 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968). The Second Circuit has
recently overturned its own long standing interpretation of the Convention, as not
creating a cause of action, basing its decision largely on the need for uniformity in
international air law. Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 918 (2d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979). The objective of uniformity has also
been recognized by the commentators. See, e.g., 1 P. MARTIN, J. MCCLEAN, E.
MARTIN, J. BRISTOW & J. BROOKS, SHAWCROSS AND BEAUMONT AIR LAW 338 (4th
ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT]; Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 498; Orr, The Warsaw Convention, 31 VA. L. REv. 423,
425-26 (1945); Comment, Air Passenger Deaths Resulting from Injuries Sustained on
or Over the High Seas and at Unknown Places; Including Considerations of the
Death on the High Seas Act, of the Warsaw Convention, and of Presumptions of
Foreign Law, 41 CORNELL L. Q. 243, 259 (1956).
30. See Warsaw Minutes, supra note 6, at 34-36, 40-41, 66.
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within the framework of contract or tort law as applied in the dif-
fering legal systems of the various member states. The delegates
undertook their task free of the constraints of existing legal sys-
tems. 3' They met to create an entirely new system of law, an inter-
national code of the air. 32
While the Convention deals with many aspects of international
air carriage, the articles dealing with the liability of the carrier
were considered to be of particular importance. 33 In accomplishing
the fundamental objective of establishing a uniform system of liabil-
ity the Convention provided a limitation of liability34 in favor of
and a presumption of liability 35 against the carrier. While it was
believed that this system would benefit passengers and shippers by
assuring them a cause of action, lessening litigation costs and even-
tually resulting in lower transportation charges, 36 it is generally ac-
cepted that the main purpose in limiting the liability of the carriers
was to foster the growth of the then infant industry. 37 The limita-
tion was meant to protect the carrier from the potentially destruc-
tive liability to which a carrier might be exposed in the case of an
air disaster.38 This protection, in addition to attracting capital
which might otherwise be invested in safer industries, provided
the carrier with a more equitable and certain basis for obtaining in-
surance.
39
31. Id. at 19 (remarks of Mr. DeVos).
32. Id. at 23 (remarks of Mr. DeVos).
33. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
34. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
35. The result of shifting the burden of proof to the carrier to show that it was
not negligent is reached by reading art. 17, see note 21 supra, together with art. 20(1)
which provides: "The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents
have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for
him or them to take such measures." Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 20(1).
Under the terms of the Montreal Agreement, note 5 supra, the carriers agree not to
invoke the art. 20(1) defense, thereby establishing a system of absolute liability on
covered flights. See generally Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 599-601.
36. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air,
S. Exec. Doc. No. G., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934), reprinted in 1934 U.S. Av. REP.
239, 242 (report of Secretary of State Cordell Hull) [hereinafter cited as Report of
Cordell Hull].
37. See, e.g., Dunn v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 589 F.2d 408, 410-11 (9th Cir.
1978); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1244 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
1 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 11.01(2) (1978); Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 498.
38. 1 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 11.01(2) (1978).
39. Report of Cordell Hull, supra note 36, at 292; D. GOEDHUIS, NATIONAL AIR
1979-19801
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The presumption of liability of the carrier, while facilitating
the recovery of the passenger and reducing litigation costs, 40 also
serves as a necessary quid pro quo for the limitation of liability. 41
In effect, the Convention trades off the presumption of liability for
the liability limitation. 42 In view of the difficulties an injured pas-
senger might encounter in prosecuting a cause of action under dif-
fering legal systems this was considered a valid compromise. 43
The balance thus struck by the drafters will undoubtedly col-
lapse if either provision is effectively circumvented. If the Conven-
tion's liability limitation is avoided "not only will the purpose of
defining the limits of the carrier's obligations be circumvented, but
in the process the Convention's most fundamental objective of pro-
viding a uniform system of liability and litigation rules for interna-
tional air disasters will be abandoned as well." 44 Although it is of-
ten argued that the airline industry is no longer in its infancy and
that the original motivation for the Convention is no longer pres-
ent, 45 it is clear that the High Contracting Parties have not aban-
doned the Convention's primary goal of uniformity of liability in in-
ternational air carriage. 46
The notion that the airline industry has matured beyond the
need for protection from catastrophic loss is itself subject to ques-
LEGISLATIONS AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION 256 (1937) [hereinafter cited as
GOEDHUIS].
40. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
41. H. DRION, LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW 28
(1954) [hereinafter cited as DRION]; Whitehead, Still Another View of the Warsaw
Convention, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 651, 654 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Whitehead].
42. Dunn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 589 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1978);
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 500.
43. Report of Cordell Hull, supra note 36, at 242; Hague Protocol to Warsaw
Convention: Hearings on Exec. H Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1965) (statement of N.E. Halaby, Administrator, FAA) [here-
inafter cited as Hague Hearings].
44. Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1092 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922
(1977).
45. See, e.g., In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114, 1125-26
(C.D. Cal. 1978); Hearings on Exec. A&B Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 101 (1977) (prepared statement of Lee S. Kreindler) [here-
inafter cited as Aviation Protocol Hearings].
46. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1244 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
See Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 917 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979); Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); Swart, Prospects of Amendment of the Warsaw Conven-
tion, 33 J. AIR. L. & CoM. 616, 617 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Swart]; 54 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 955-57 (June 13, 1966).
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tion and has been strongly criticized.4 7 Furthermore, even if we
were to assume that the United States carriers have grown to a po-
sition of sufficient financial strength to meet the growing burdens
of capital expenditure and increased loss exposure,48 the same is
not true of many of the smaller foreign carriers.4 9 For the United
States to adopt a parochial attitude and either impose on these car-
riers an unlimited liability or, in the alternative, effectively deny
them access to the American travelling public would expose them
to the risk of economic failure and could lead to undesirable diplo-
matic consequences. 5 0
The Bali court argued that the Convention's remaining utility
is only as "a general international expression of the need for uni-
form air laws"5 1 and that the "liability limitation is no longer via-
ble." 52 While this might be so if the Bali decision is accepted, it
does not follow from any cited authority. 53 In making this assertion
the court contended that the United States denunciation of the
Warsaw Convention, the approval of the Montreal Agreement and
subsequent withdrawal of denunciation indicated that the United
States preferred the right to a high damage recovery to uniformity
47. Aviation Protocol Hearings, supra note 45, at 41 (prepared statement of
James E. Landry, Vice President and General Counsel, Air Transp. Assoc. of Am.),
114 (report of ABA, Sec. of Int'l Law); Stephen, The Montreal Conference and Inter-
national Aviation Liability Limitations, 33 J. Am L. & COM. 554, 581-86 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Stephen].
48. See I Minutes, Special ICAO Meeting on Limits for Passengers Under the
Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, Montreal, February 1-15, 1966, ICAO
Doe. 8584-LC/154-1, viii [hereinafter cited as Montreal Minutes]; SHAWCROSS &
BEAUMONT, supra note 29, at 341.
49. Montreal Minutes, supra note 48, at 14 (remarks of the delegate of the
U.S.S.R.), 16 (remarks of the delegate of the Congo), 19-20 (remarks of the IATA ob-
server), 21 (remarks of the delegate of Mali); Stephen, supra note 47, at 585.
50. Aviation Protocol Hearings, supra not0\45, at 41 (prepared statement of
James E. Landry, Vice President and General Counsel, Air Transp. Assoc. of Am.),
50 (statement of Floyd D. Hall, Chairman of the Exec. Comm., IATA), 110 (prepared
statement of Charles N. Brower, ABA Int'l Law Sec.); Montreal Minutes, supra note
48, at 14 (remarks of the delegate of Senegal), 21 (remarks of the delegate of Mali).
51. 462 F. Supp. at 1124.
52. Id.
53. The only authority cited by the court is a Department of State Press Re-
lease, id., which declares that "the interests of the United States travelling public
and of international civil aviation would be best served by continuing within the
framework of the Warsaw Convention ...." Dep't of State Press Release No. 110
(May 13, 1966), reprinted in, 54 DEP'T STATE BULL. 955-56 (June 13, 1966). It goes
on to say that the acceptance of the Montreal Agreement has "assured the continua-
tion of the uniform system of law . . .and . . .demonstrated again the viability of the
system .... . Id.
1979-1980]
78 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW FORUM [Vol. 3:71
with respect to the liability limitation. 54 It is, of course, indisput-
able that the United States dissatisfaction with the Warsaw system
was due to the low level of the liability limitation. 55 The with-
drawal of denunciation in conjunction with the consummation of
the Montreal Agreement, however, reaffirmed the United States
commitment to the Warsaw system, provided that the level of the
limitation was sufficient, in the eyes of the government, to protect
American passengers. 56
During the time since the approval of the Montreal Agree-
ment, the United States has supplied the primary impetus in ef-
forts to modernize the Warsaw system. 57 The improvements sought
include provisions allowing carriers to take advantage of tech-
nological advances such as electronic ticketing, 58 but the main
thrust of the United States effort has been to increase the level of
recoveries for personal injuries and death. 59 Any doubt as to the
official United States position with respect to the continued vital-
ity of the Warsaw system was removed during the 1977 Senate
hearings on the Montreal Protocols.60 At that time, representatives
of the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Department of State and the
54. 462 F. Supp. at 1124.
55. Dep't of State Press Release No. 268 (Nov. 15, 1965), reprinted in 53
DEP'T STATE BULL. 923-25 (Dec. 6, 1965); Hague Hearings, supra note 43, at 19
(statement of N.E. Halaby, Administrator, FAA). See, e.g., Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d
1079, 1086 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp.
Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1244 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
56. Dep't of State Press Release No. 110 (May 13, 1966), reprinted in, 54 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 955-56 (June 13, 1966).
57. Aviation Protocol Hearings, supra note 45, at 13 (prepared statement of
Linda Heller Kamm, General Counsel, Dep't of Transp.), 37 (statement of James
E. Landry, General Counsel, Air Transp. Assoc. of Am.), 52 (prepared statement
of Floyd D. Hall, Chairman of the Exec. Comm., IATA), 110 (prepared statement of
Charles N. Brower, ABA, Sec. of Int'l Law).
58. Id. at 3 (statement of Herbert J. Hansell, Legal Advisor, Dep't of State), 10
(statement of Linda Heller Kamm, General Counsel, Dep't of Transp.), 46 (prepared
statement of James E. Landry, General Counsel, Air Transp. Assoc. of Am.).
59. Id. at 11 (prepared statement of Linda Heller Kamm, General Counsel,
Dep't of Transp.), 41 (prepared statement of James E. Landry, General Counsel, Air
Transp. Assoc. of Am.).
60. Aviation Protocol Hearings, supra note 45. The Protocols under considera-
tion contain the most recent revisions of the Warsaw Convention, relating to passen-
gers (Montreal Protocol 3) and cargo (Montreal Protocol 4). Id. at 4 (statement of
Herbert J. Hansell, Legal Advisor. Dep't of State). Protocol 3 is essentially the
Guatemala Protocol, note 125 infra, with the Special Drawings Rights of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (SDR) replacing the "Poincar6 Franc" as the monetary unit in
which the limitation of liability is expressed. Aviation Protocol Hearings, supra note
45, at 41 (prepared statement of James E. Landry, General Counsel, Air Transp.
Assoc. of Am.).
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Department of Transportation made strong statements in favor of
continued United States participation in a modified Warsaw sys-
tem. 61 While the United States has advocated modifications of the
Warsaw system in addition to increased recoveries, 6 2 it has con-
tinously adhered to the principle of limitation so that carriers are
insulated from liability for more than a fixed and determinable sum
for injuries arising out of international air transportation. 63
It is the function of the courts to interpret and apply the Con-
vention's provisions so that this continuing and explicit federal pol-
icy is carried out. 64 Court decisions which would effectively except
wrongful death actions from the coverage of the Warsaw system
may result in a de facto withdrawal of the United States at a time
when its government is working strenuously to save the system in
a much improved and modernized form. Such decisions tend to
impair the credibility of the United States and may be damaging to
the diplomatic effort.65
II. THE NATURE OF THE LIABILITY LIMITATION
A. Effect of Articles 1 and 3
Central to the result in Bali is the court's interpretation of the
Warsaw Convention as creating contractual limitation of liability.66
In accepting the contractual theory the court apparently relied on
the fact that the Convention applies only when there is interna-
tional transportation "according to the contract made by the par-
ties." 67 The applicability of the Convention is dependent upon the
contract only to the extent that it is the contract which determines
61. Aviation Protocol Hearings, supra note 45, at 5-6 (prepared statement of
Herbert J. Hansell, Legal Advisor, Dep't of State), 11-12 (prepared statement
of Linda Heller Kamm, General Counsel, Dep't of Transp.), 17 (prepared statement
of Peter B. Schwarzkopf, Assistant General Counsel, Int'l Affairs, CAB).
62. Note 58 supra and accompanying text.
63. Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922
(1977).
64. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1942); Rocca v. Thompson,
223 U.S. 317, 331-32 (1912); Chicago, B. & Quincy R.R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549,
564-65 (1911); Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1090 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
922 (1977).
65. See, e.g., Caplan, Insurance, Warsaw Convention, Changes Made Necessary
by the 1966 Montreal Agreement and Possibility of Denunciation of the Convention,
33 J. AIR L. & CoM. 663, 668-69 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Caplan].
66. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
67. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(2). See 462 F. Supp. at 1119.
1979-19801
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whether the contemplated transportation is international. 6 It is the
existence of such a contract and not the contract itself which makes
the Convention applicable.6 9
The rationale for the emphasis on the contract in this regard is
that the applicability of the Convention is determined in advance,
by virtue of the agreement, and is not dependent on the actual
route taken or other criteria which may be controlled by fortuitous
circumstances. 70 Instead, the application of the treaty, and thereby
the limitation of liability, arises by virtue of the existence of a con-
tract with specified stopping places. 71 The contract is not one for
the limitation of liability or for the application of any other provi-
sion of the Convention, but given such a contract the Convention
automatically applies of its own force, "not because the parties
have so agreed."-72 "[T]he limitation of liability . . .is not a con-
tractual but a legal one ..... " 3The distinction is well drawn in the
case of Garcia v. Pan American Airways. 74 In that case the next of
kin, bringing suit in their own right, pursuant to the wrongful death
68. The Convention defines international carriage as "any carriage in which,
according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of
destination .. .are situated either within the territories of two High Contracting Par-
ties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed
stopping place within the territory ... of another Power." Warsaw Convention, supra
note 1, art. 1(2). See, e.g., Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323,
333-34 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); Ross v. Pan Am. Airways,
299 N.Y. 88, 97, 85 N.E.2d 880, 885 (1949); GOEDHUIS, supra note 39, at 121; 1 L.
KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 11.05(1) (1978); SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT,
supra note 29, at 393.
69. Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851, 857 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965); Ross v. Pan Am. Airways, 299 N.Y. 88, 97, 85 N.E.2d
880, 885 (1949).
70. Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 332 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); Egan v. Kollsman Instr. Corp., 21 N.Y.2d
160, 165-66, 234 N.E.2d 199, 201, 287 N.Y.S.2d 14, 17 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1039 (1968); Ross v. Pan Am. Airways, 299 N.Y. 88, 97, 85 N.E.2d 880, 885 (1949);
GOEDHUIS, supra note 39, at 121.
71. Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 333-34 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); Ross v. Pan Am. Airways, 299 N.Y. 88, 97,
85 N.E.2d 880, 885 (1949); Garcia v. Pan Am. Airways, 269 A.D. 287, 290, 55
N.Y.S.2d 317, 320-21 (1945), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 852, 67 N.E.2d 257, cert. denied, 329
U.S. 741 (1946). For the view that this system leads to "preposterous results," see 1
L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 11.05(1) (1978).
72. Ross v. Pan Am. Airways, 299 N.Y. 88, 97, 85 N.E.2d 880, 885 (1949).
73. DRION, supra note 41, at 162. See Warsaw Minutes, supra note 6, at 42 (re-
marks of Sir Alfred Dennis).
74. 269 A.D. 287, 55 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1945), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 852, 67 N.E.2d 257,
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 741 (1946).
WARSAW CONVENTION
law of Portugal, 75 contended that the agreement of the deceased to
limit liability was not binding on them in such an action. 76 The
court, in affirming the denial of plaintiff's motion to strike certain
affirmative defenses, treated this contention as relating only to the
defense that the provisions of the Convention were expressly appli-
cable by the agreement of the parties, as embodied in the ticket,
and not to the primary defense that the transportation of the dece-
dent came within the terms of the Convention. 77
The Bali court also relied upon the provisions of Article 378
which require that the carrier deliver a ticket to the passenger con-
taining specified information, including a statement that the trans-
portation is subject to the rules of the Warsaw Convention. 79 If a
proper ticket is not delivered to the passenger, the carrier is pre-
cluded from asserting the liability limitation. 80
Some courts have been strict in construing the delivery re-
quirement. In Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc. ,s1 it was found
that delivery of a ticket after the passenger had boarded the plane
was insufficient.82 It has also been held that delivery at the board-
ing ramp was insufficient 83 and that the requirement was not met
by the delivery of a ticket in which the notice of the applicability of
the Convention was "camouflaged in Lilliputian priht ..... 84
The court in Bali found support for its contractual approach in
these and other ticket notice cases8 5 and to that extent has misread
them.86 The decisions have focused on giving the passenger ade-
quate notice of the liability limitation so that he can protect himself
by obtaining insurance or by other means. 87 These cases have not
75. Id. at 289, 55 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
76. Id. at 293, 55 N.Y.S.2d at 322-23.
77. Id.
78. 462 F. Supp. at 1119-20.
79. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1).
80. Id. art. 3(2); e.g., Ross v. Pan Am. Airways, 299 N.Y. 88, 97, 85 N.E.2d 880,
885 (1949).
81. 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965).
82. Id. at 857.
83. Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494, 498 (9th Cir. 1965).
84. Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 253 F. Supp. 237, 243 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd by an equally divided court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
85. 462 F. Supp. at 1121.
86. The Bali court asserted that the ticket notice cases demonstrated "the
courts' protection of injured parties from Warsaw's liability limitations, in part
through contractual and contract-like principles." 462 F. Supp. at 1122-23.
87. Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1965);
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interpreted the non-delivery of a proper passenger ticket as having
any contractual significance. The Convention itself provides that
the absence, irregularity or loss of a passenger ticket does not af-
fect the contract of transportation.88 The contract would still be
subject to the provisions of the Convention89 even though the car-
rier would be estopped from asserting the provisions providing for
a limitation of liability. 90 A close reading of Article 3(2) reveals that
the provisions of the Convention are not incorporated into the con-
tract of carriage but rather that the contract is "subject to" the
Convention. 91
B. Effect of the Montreal Agreement
The Montreal Agreement 92 is, according to its terms, a "spe-
cial agreement" within the meaning of Article 22(1) of the Warsaw
Convention. 93 Article 22(1) clearly contemplates a contract between
the passenger and the carrier whereby the carrier agrees to an in-
creased liability limit.94 This is obviously a simplistic view of the
Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F:2d 851, 856-57 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 816 (1965); Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 253 F. Supp. 237, 239
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd by an equally divided court, 390
U.S. 455 (1968). The drafters of the Convention expected that passengers would be
covered by insurance. Warsaw Minutes, supra note 6, at 40 (remarks of Mr. Flandin),
47 (remarks of Mr. Ciannini), 48 (remarks of Mr. Ripert). One of the arguments ad-
vanced in favor of retaining a system of limited liability is that it is more equitable to
distribute the risk through insurance rather than through the carrier. Swart, supra
note 46, at 617. The rationale is that if the carrier is forced to pay unlimited damages
it will pass along the cost to all passengers equally so that the "poor" passengers,
those whose recoveries would be less than the liability limits in any event, are
forced to pay for the relatively few "affluent" passengers. Id.
88. "The absence, irregularity or loss of the passenger ticket shall not affect the
existence or the validity of the contract of transportation, which shall nonetheless be
subject to the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passen-
ger without a passenger ticket having been delivered he shall not be entitled to avail
himself of those provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability."
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(2) (emphasis added).
89. Id.; Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494, 496-97 (9th Cir. 1965);
Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 229 F. Supp. 801, 808 (N.D. Ga. 1964),
aff'd, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
90. Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494, 496-97 (9th Cir. 1965);
Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851, 856-57 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382,
U.S. 816 (1965); Ross v. Pan Am. Airways, 299 N.Y. 88, 97, 85 N.E.2d 880, 885
(1949).
91. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(2) (quoted at note 88 supra).
92. Note 5 supra.
93. Id. See, e.g., 54 DEP'T STATE BULL. 955-57 (June 13, 1966); Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 597.
94. "In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for each pas-
senger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs .... Nevertheless, by special
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Montreal Agreement which bears little resemblance to a freely ne-
gotiated contract. 95 While the Montreal Agreement is described as
a special contract, its status as such and indeed the very designa-
tion of "Montreal Agreement" has been criticized. 96 Regardless of
what it purports to be, the Montreal Agreement is not a contract
between the passenger and the carrier. In reality, it is an agree-
ment between the world's international carriers and the United
States government whereby the carriers agree that they will not as-
sert certain protections of the Warsaw Convention in exchange for
the agreement of the United States to withdraw its denunciation of
the Convention. 97 Analyzed contractually, it would appear to be a
third party beneficiary contract, the intended beneficiaries of which
are the passengers and their families.
The characterization of the Montreal Agreement as a special
agreement pursuant to Article 22(1) is merely an attempt to justify
the United States' action98 which some observers consider to be a
unilateral amendment of the Convention.99 The fallacy of this at-
tempted justification is pointed out by the inability of Article 22(1)
to validate the more fundamental modification of the Convention
caused by the adoption of a system of absolute liability.' 00
Assuming, however, that the Montreal Agreement is a special
agreement pursuant to Article 22(1), the assertion that it provides
"an authoritative rule ...as to the meaning of the original Warsaw
Convention's limitation of liability" which establishes that the Con-
vention's liability limitation is contractual 01' cannot be sustained.
contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability."
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22(1).
95. See, e.g., Milligan, The Warsaw Convention-Did the Carriers Take All Pos-
sible Measures to Avoid the Damage to the Convention or Was It Impossible For
Them to Take Such Measures?, 33 J. AIR L. & CoM. 675 (1967).
96. See Discussion-Session One, Symposium on the Warsaw Convention, 33 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 542, 545 (1967) (remarks of Prof. Mankiewicz).
97. See generally Hildred, Air Carriers' Liability: Significance of the Warsaw
Convention and Events Leading Up to the Montreal Agreement, 33 J. AIs L. & COM.
521, 524-25 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hildred].
98. Mankiewicz, The 1971 Protocol of Guatemala City to Further Amend the
1929 Warsaw Convention, 38 J. AIR L. & CoM. 519, 529 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Mankiewicz].
99. Hildred, supra note 97, at 521; Whitehead, supra note 41, at 656.
100. The imposition of absolute liability is accomplished by the agreement of
the carrier not to "avail itself of any defense under Article 20(1) of said [Warsaw]
Convention." Montreal Agreement, supra note 5. See Caplan, supra note 65, at
670-710.
101. In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114, 1123 (C.D. Cal.
1978).
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The Bali court reasoned that if it were not, it could not be
modified by a scheme which is "clearly contractual.' 0 2 This line of
reasoning is unpersuasive. The assumption appears to be that if the
Convention can be modified by such a contract it must be, essen-
tially, contractual in nature, and impliedly, that if it cannot be
modified by contract it is not contractual in nature. With the ex-
ception of the very narrow and explicit provision of Article 22(1) for
the increase of the limit of liability,' 03 the Convention provides
generally that its provisions cannot be altered by contract or special
agreement. 10 4 Does this indicate that the Convention is not con-
tractual in nature? What it does point out is that this line of rea-
soning, if it has any validity at all, is inconclusive when applied to
the Warsaw Convention.
Whatever value the Montreal Agreement may have in inter-
preting the Warsaw Convention can be appreciated only through a
consideration of the circumstances leading to its adoption.
On November 15, 1965 the United States, due solely to its
dissatisfaction with the low limits of liability, served notice of its
denunciation of the Warsaw Convention.' 05 The fear that the en-
tire Warsaw system would collapse if the United States' denuncia-
tion was permitted to take effect 10 6 added a sense of urgency to the
events culminating in the Montreal Agreement.10 7
After an emergency meeting convened by the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)108 failed to produce any hope of
an early diplomatic solution, 10 9 Article 22(1)'s provision for a spe-
cial agreement was considered as the only viable alternative to al-
lowing the denunciation to take effect. 110 Initially, the prospects
for success seemed remote."' The combined efforts of the United
States and the International Air Transport Association (IATA), how-
102. Id.
103. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22(1) (quoted at note 94 supra).
104. "Any clause contained in the contract and all special agreements entered
into before the damage occurred by which the parties purport to infringe the rules
laid down by the Convention ... shall be null and void." Warsaw Convention, supra
note 1, art. 32.
105. 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 923-2"5 (Dec. 6, 1965).
106. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 590.
107. Id. at 563. See Montreal Minutes, supra note 48, at v.
108. The meeting was convened in Montreal "as a matter of urgency."
Montreal Minutes, supra note 48, at v.
109. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 575.
110. See generally id. at 586-88.
111. Id. at 590.
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ever, succeeded in obtaining the acceptance of the proposed agree-
ment in time to allow the United States to withdraw its notice of
denunciation two days prior to its scheduled effective date."1
2
Contrary to the position taken by the Bali court, 1 3 the events
leading to the approval of the Montreal Agreement demonstrate
that it cannot be viewed as an authoritative interpretation by the
United States as to the nature of the Convention's liability limita-
tion. It is a "jerry built" attempt to resolve the United States' dis-
satisfaction with the low limit of liability, 14 "contrived in haste and
presented to the world's airlines as something of a Hobson's
choice."115
III. ARTICLE 24 IS CONCLUSIVE
Article 24116 should, in any event, resolve any doubt as to the
Convention's application in wrongful death actions. 117 Article 24
recognizes that under the laws of different countries the passenger
or his representative might bring an action either in tort or in con-
tract. 118 The purpose of the article is "[t]o prevent the carrier from
falling under a regime of liability other than that of the Warsaw
Convention. '"" 9 Article 24 was meant to apply to wrongful death
actions so as to preclude the surviving next of kin of a deceased pas-
senger from maintaining an action against the carrier beyond the
scope of the Convention's provisions. This is demonstrated by the
112. Id. at 594-96.
113. Note 101 supra and accompanying text.
114. Whitehead, supra note 41, at 661.
115. Id. at 656.
116. (1) In the cases covered by Articles 18 and 19 any action for damages,
however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits
set out in this Convention. (2) In the cases covered by Article 17 the provi-
sions of the preceding paragraph shall also apply, without prejudice to the
questions as to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and
what are their respective rights.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 24.
117. Article 24 has been interpreted as establishing that the Convention pro-
vides the exclusive relief for any injury resulting from an accident in international air
carriage. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1244-45 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). See, e.g., DRION, supra note 41, at 135; GOEDHUIS, supra note 39, at 266-70;
Warsaw Minutes, supra note 6, at 255 (report of Mr. DeVos).
118. DRION, supra note 41, at 135-36; GOEDHUIS, supra note 39, at 267.
119. GOEDHUIS, supra note 39, at 267. The drafters of the Convention appar-
ently agreed that the effect of article 24 "however founded" language was to "ex-
clude recourse to common law." Warsaw Minutes, supra note 6, at 213 (remarks of
Sir Alfred Dennis). See Mankiewicz, supra note 98, at 530-31.
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draft presented to the Warsaw Delegates by CITEJA 2 0 which pro-
vided that any action "even in the case of death of the interested
party" would be subject to the limits of the Convention. 121 This
phrase was not retained in the final version of the Convention, ap-
parently for stylistic reasons, 122 and it is clear that no substantive
change was intended. 123
The "however founded" language of Article 24, when taken in
conjunction with the reference to Article 17, can only mean that
any action that may be maintained against the carrier with respect
to the death of a passenger is subject to the Convention's provi-
sions. The clear intendment of the phrase, "however founded," is
to prevent the circumvention of the Convention by treating it as
applicable only to actions in contract while permitting an unlimited
action in tort, and vice versa. 124 The drafters of the Guatemala
Protocol,' 2 5 apparently concerned about efforts to avoid the Con-
vention's provisions, strengthened the language of Article 24 by
providing that all actions "whether under this Convention or in
contract or in tort or otherwise" shall be subject to the conditions
of the Convention. 126 In so doing they were attempting to pre-
clude the very method of circumvention employed by the court in
the Bali opinion.
The question not reached by the Warsaw Convention is who,
120. The Comit6 International Technique d'Experts Jurisdique Aeriens was
formed by the First International Conference on Private Air Law, Paris 1925 and
prepared the draft Convention presented to the delegates at Warsaw. SHAWCROSS &
BEAUMONT, supra note 29, at 339.
121. Warsaw Minutes, supra note 6, at 265.
122. The draft of article 24 which was put to a vote and adopted with modifica-
tions, contained three paragraphs. Id. at 211-14. The first encompassed what is now
article 24 and included the phrase "even in the case of death." Id. at 211. The sec-
ond and third paragraphs are now contained in article 25. Id. at 214. The task of di-
viding the original article 24 into two separate articles was referred to the drafting
committee, id. at 213, which deleted the phrase. The President of the drafting
committee subsequently described the revision of article 24 as "merely a formal
one." Id. at 229.
123. The drafting committee may have considered it surplusage since art. 24 in-
corporates art. 17 which explicitly applies in cases of death. Warsaw Convention, su-
pra note 1, arts. 24, 17.
124. Mankiewicz, supra note 98, at 530-31.
125. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw 12 October 1929 as
Amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on 28 September 1955, March 8, 1971,
ICAO Doc. 8932 (1971) [hereinafter cited as the Guatemala Protocol], reprinted in
64 DEP'T STATE BULL. 555 (April 26, 1971).
126. Id. art. IX; Mankiewicz, supra note 98, at 531.
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in the event of death, has the right to sue and what are the com-
pensable damages. 127 In leaving this question to be resolved by the
law of the forum12 the drafters assumed the Convention encom-
passed situations in which the damage action would be brought by
persons other than the passenger or his personal representative
and that such actions would be subject to the liability limitation. 129
In fact, it has generally been agreed that the Convention's limita-
tion of liability applies "to the aggregate of claims made by the
heirs or dependent members of the family of the fatally injured
passenger."' 30 Privity of contract is not required in order to subject
a claimant to the limitation of liability. 131
The courts of the United States have consistently applied the
Convention's limits to wrongful death actions brought by persons
suing in their own right. 1'3 2 In Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France,'33 the court, applying the law of Portugal to a wrongful
death action, 134 expressly found that the action was one in tort and
not in contract. 135 The court went on to say that the limitation of
liability provided by Article 22 was not a contractual defense but
rather a condition "attached to the 'cause of action.' -136 In
reaching this conclusion the court, referring to Article 24, found
that while the Convention did not address the question of who has
the right to sue, it did attach "a number of conditions to the right
127. Warsaw Minutes, supra note 6, at 255 (report of Mr. DeVos).
128. See, e.g., Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 922 (2d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979) (Van Graufeiland, J., dissenting); Reed
v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1092 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); GOEDHUIS,
supra note 39, at 270.
129. Warsaw Minutes, supra note 6, at 255 (report of Mr. DeVos); DRION, supra
note 41, at 135-36, 324.
130. Mankiewicz, supra note 98, at 528; see DRION, supra note 41, at 327.
131. DRION, supra note 41, at 135, 162. See, e.g., Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079
(2d Cir.) (by implication), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); Garcia v. Pan Am. Air-
ways, 269 A.D. 287, 55 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1945) (by implication), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 852, 67
N.E.2d 257, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 741 (1946).
132. See, e.g., Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979); Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); Garcia v. Pan Am. Airways, 269 A.D. 287, 55
N.Y.S.2d 317 (1945), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 852, 67 N.E.2d 257, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 741
(1946).
133. 111 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436
(2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 820 (1954).
134. Id. at 404.
135. Id. at 401.
136. Id.
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of action created by the lex loci .... "137
The more recent case of Reed v. Wiser,'38 applied the "how-
ever founded" language of Article 24139 to preclude recovery
against agents of the carrier, not party to the contract of carriage,
for amounts in excess of the liability limits of the Convention. 140 In
interpreting Article 24 the court pointed out that to the extent that
the word "cases" might be interpreted to mean lawsuit it is an in-
accurate translation of the French word cas, which might be more
accurately understood to apply the conditions and limits of the
Convention to any cause of action arising out of "events" contem-
plated by Article 17.141 The death of a passenger is clearly an
event covered by Article 17142 therefore, any action "however
founded" arising from such death is subject to the limitations pro-
vided by the Convention.1 43
CONCLUSION
Even if the limitation of liability provided by the Convention
were contractual, the determination by the courts of a state that no
contract of a decedent can interfere with the rights of dependents
in a wrongful death action established under its laws144 must fall as
contrary to the superior federal public policy expressed in the
Warsaw Convention. 145 It is important "that the purpose of the
Warsaw system and the intent of its drafters . ..must .. .have
been to establish the exclusive relief available for damages re-
sulting from an injury sustained in international transportation.' '146
137. Id. at 403. The Second Circuit now holds that the Warsaw Convention not
only conditions but, in fact, creates a cause of action for injury and death in interna-
tional air transportation. Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 918
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979); see Note, The Warsaw Conven-
tion-Does It Create a Cause of Action, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 366 (1978).
138. 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).
139. See note 116 supra.
140. 555 F.2d at 1093.
141. Id. at 1084; see also Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238,
1245 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
142. See note 21 supra.
143. See note 119 supra and accompanying text.
144. See notes 10-11 supra and accompanying text.
145. Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 229 F. Supp. 801, 810-11 (N.D.
Ga. 1964), aff'd 386 F.2d 323 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); Indemnity
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 58 F. Supp. 338, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). See United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
146. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1244 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). See note 119 supra and accompanying text.
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The very foundation of the treaty will be undermined if an injury
contemplated by the provisions of the Convention is permitted to
give rise to an independent cause of action not subject to the Con-
vention's conditions and limits.
Mark S. Flynn

